Institutional Conflict
Politiek in Nederland
Institutional Conflict
As a comparative study on patterns of institutional conflicts in 25 European countries (including established and non-consolidated democracies), this project formulates several hypotheses on the level, focus and duration of institutional conflict in various stages of democratic development. It tests two major theses on the explanation of elite-conflict over institutions. First the prone-ness to conflict of specific institutions (‘subversiveness-thesis’) and secondly the historical legacy-thesis, arguing the relevance of previous institutional design and change. The project adopts a dynamic and quantitative approach to institutions in order to develop a comprehensive explanatory theoretical framework on democratisation, institutional conflict, patterns of elite competition and democratic stability of regimes. It departs from the assumption that conflicts between key political actors are not limited to positions of power and political outcomes alone, but often include conflicts over the design and transformation of the existing institutional framework. Although it is correct to conceive of democracy as a permanent struggle between political elites within their institutional context, we argue it is equally essential to consider the institutional context to be part of this permanent struggle. Political actors in a democracy also battle over institutions.
Central to our analysis are conflicts between key political players over the institutional framework both within consolidated and consolidating democracies. We assume that the specific timing and nature of initial institutional choices determine to a large extent the likelihood that those institutions will be accepted as the legitimate institutional context in which to conduct everyday politics. Consequently, the level of legitimacy acquired by such initial institutions will determine the extent to which political actors decide to wage new battles against existing institutions. One of our assumptions is that, over time, institutional conflict declines and a regime becomes consolidated (a situation characterised by high levels of consensus over the legitimacy of existing institutions). Next to this analysis of the level of institutional conflict we analyse the focus of institutional battles (which institutions are subject to conflict) as well as the duration of these conflicts. We assume that certain (combinations of) institutions may be more prone to conflict than others and specific institutional conflicts may have distinct time spans. By comparing institutional conflicts across time and space we aim to gain insight into which level of institutional conflict makes for a vibrant and adaptive democratic setting and which level and type of institutional conflict undermines stability of the democratic polity. Ultimately we aim to develop a more general model of interaction between the intensity of institutional conflict and democratic development and consolidation.
In the project we will compare patterns of institutional conflict and change within 25 European countries, both established democracies and democratizing cases. The complete set of cases is, for Central and Eastern Europe Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Slovakia and Slovenia, and for Western and Southern Europe Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.